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Abstract 
The Department of Defense (DoD) requires insight into the risks that the Budget Control Act 
(BCA) is placing on the defense industrial base (DIB), particularly in those sectors that have 
been previously identified as critical and at high-risk of losing critical capabilities. The Office 
of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy 
(ODASD[MIBP]) has developed a methodology to identify the impact of budget cuts on the 
DIB. During 2014 and 2015, the MIBP identified capabilities provided by the DIB that were at 
high risk of being compromised or unavailable to the warfighter using the fragility and 
criticality methodology and implemented mitigation plans to sustain the industrial base. 
Funding to execute mitigation plans was included in the FY16 Presidential Budget. The MIBP 
created an assessment approach to evaluate the impact of the BCA on the DIB. Only the 
sectors and tiers previously identified as high risk were assessed. The framework evaluates 
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the loss of design and manufacturing skills, loss of innovation, loss of competition, and loss of 
infrastructure. In addition, potential DoD steps to sustain high risk sectors, sub-sectors, and 
tiers under a BCA environment were identified. DoD leadership is using the results to inform 
resource decision making. 
Introduction 
The industrial base is an integral part of the Department of Defense (DoD) force 
structure needed to provide the highest performance and innovative capabilities to the 
warfighter. However, the current budgetary situation is forcing industry to make business 
decisions that will have long term consequences in the nation’s ability to advance its 
technological capabilities. Defense industry consolidations, challenges incentivizing new 
entrants to the DoD’s critical markets, and loss of design teams and manufacturing skills due 
to procurement reductions are some of the main factors threatening the industrial base. 
Consolidation trends have led to the creation of six “mega-prime” providers today—reducing 
competition and creating barriers to entry due to their sheer financial size. Budget 
uncertainty and industry’s perception of DoD contracting practices and intellectual property 
protection limit the interest of non-traditional companies from working with the DoD. 
Procurement and research and development (R&D) programs, which have been delayed or 
cancelled, also have an impact on industry’s ability to retain its design teams and exercise 
the critical manufacturing skills for defense-unique products. 
While budget swings are not new to the DoD, the trends and challenges discussed 
above are impacting today’s defense industrial base (DIB) and limiting its ability to support 
the technological superiority requirements of the Department. In addition, appropriations 
have consistently fallen short of carefully planned President’s Budgets. 
As illustrated in Figure 1, the DoD and industry will have to overcome several 
budgetary challenges: 
 The Services need to balance force structure, readiness, and capability to 
meet national security commitments in their President’s Budget submissions. 
Programs like the Ohio Replacement and Long Range Strike Bombers are 
part of the U.S. strategy to modernize nuclear weapons systems and the 
number one priority for the Navy and AF, respectively. In order to fund these 
programs, the Services will have to make other procurement, readiness, or 
force structure trade-offs. These decisions are extremely difficult due to 
competing priorities and their effect on the long-term strategies. 
 Current programs are moving from design and manufacturing stages to 
operations and maintenance. This situation creates a design and 
manufacturing gap that puts at risk the industry’s ability to sustain and 
exercise the critical skills for the advanced weapons systems required in the 
future. 
 As the war winds down and U.S. forces reduce their role in active combat, the 
declining demand for some defense-unique products adds pressure to mid 
and lower tiers of the industrial base that depend on DoD business to achieve 
their minimum sustainment rates. 
 Budgetary uncertainty has contributed to companies’ adoption of an income-
focused strategy as defense firms invest in share buy-backs, dividends, and 
mergers or divestitures to create income and improve profitability. Without the 
ability to plan for future programs, industry is reluctant to invest in R&D, yet 
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the DoD relies on industry’s R&D for innovation, technical dominance, and 
increased efficiency. 
 
 DoD Investments on Procurement—Actuals vs. Presidential Budget 
(PB) 
The current situation of the defense industrial base is exacerbated by the Budget 
Control Act (BCA) of 2011, which proposed DoD spending reductions of approximately 10% 
annually for the next 10 years. Figure 2 provides a summary of the events related to the 
BCA and the effect on the FY16 PB for the DoD. In the National Defense Authorization Act 
of FY15, Congress expressed concerns about the effect of the BCA on the industrial base. 
Consequently, Congress requested the Office of the Secretary of Defense to provide an 
analysis of sectors and tiers of the private industrial base found to be at highest risk, and 
how the risk assessment has changed since enactment of the BCA of 2011. This paper 
outlines the framework developed by the Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy (MIBP) 
Office to assess the industrial base risks and provides a summary of the results. 
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 Budget Control Act Events and Effect on FY16 Presidential Budget (PB) 
for the DoD 
Defining Industrial Base Risks  
The DoD defines industrial base risks as uncertainties regarding industry’s ability to 
design, manufacture, and sustain the DoD’s present and future critical capabilities. A critical 
capability is defined as a capability difficult to replace if disrupted. A critical capability will 
have a combination of the following characteristics: defense-unique; requires specialized 
skills to integrate, manufacture, or maintain the capability; requires defense-specific 
knowledge to reproduce this capability, an alternative, or the next generation design; 
requires the use of specialized equipment and/or facilities for manufacturing and 
sustainment; the time required to restore the capability will have a negative impact on the 
mission; and the availability of alternatives to meet DoD needs without the capability. The 
Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manufacturing and Industrial Base 
Policy (ODASD[MIBP]) uses FaC1 assessments to identify critical capabilities. 
The MIBP developed risk definitions (see Tables 1 and 2) to assess the industrial 
base risks for each sector, sub-sector, tier, and sub-tier, as required. In some cases, the 
evaluation considered a sub-sector, while in other cases, a tier or sub-tier was assessed. A 
sector refers to the big segments of the industrial base providing similar or related products 
and services in a given market. A sub-sector divides the sectors based on more specific 
activities and/or products. Tiers define the specific components and services required to 
manufacture a final product. Sub-tiers divide the components and services into specific 
                                            
 
 
1 In 2011, the MIBP was tasked with developing a forward-leaning approach that could identify the 
cumulative effect on vital capabilities of procurement decisions across programs and Services. The 
organization used the existing 1996 framework to develop a methodology that could be used 
proactively, across Services and industrial sectors, that is rigorous, repeatable, and transparent. That 
methodology to assess the industrial base is known as the Fragility and Criticality assessment 
process, or FaC for short. 
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products, similar to those found in a bill of material. Figure 3 provides an example of the 
relationship between sectors, sub-sectors, and tiers. 
 
 Aircraft—Sector, Sub-Sectors, and Tiers 
The analysis framework was based on the two risk components: likelihood and 
consequence. The risk level ranges from low to high based on the likelihood of losing a 
critical capability and the ability to reconstitute the capability once it is lost. 
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 Industrial Base Risk Definition—Likelihood 
 
Table 2 describes the consequences of losing a critical capability. Consequences are 
defined according to five main areas that are critical to design, develop, test, and sustain 
current and future weapons systems: design skills, manufacturing skills, innovation, 
competition, and infrastructure. One risk may have consequences in multiple areas. 
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 Industrial Base Risks Definitions—Consequences 
 
Defining Industrial Base Sectors at Risk 
The MIBP used the results of FaC assessments conducted between 2013 and 2014, 
industrial base reports, and inputs from subject matter experts to identify sectors at high risk 
of losing critical capabilities, considering factors like current and future demand, acquisition 
phase of major programs, and mitigation strategies. The following sectors were identified at 
higher risk: 
 Missiles and Munitions Sector—The missile and munitions sector is 
comprised of the DoD’s smart bombs and tactical and strategic missiles. This 
sector is primarily a defense-unique industrial sector and, therefore, is highly 
dependent on the DoD’s demand. Over the past decade, the munitions and 
missile sector has provided no new-start missile opportunities, as all “new” 
missile programs have been designated as, or have become, upgrades to 
existing systems. 
 Space Sector—The space sector is primarily driven by the commercial 
market and includes satellites, launch services, ground systems, networks, 
payloads, propulsion, and electronics. Although the commercial focus of this 
sector allows leveraging the commercial technology advancement, security 
restrictions limit the benefits. Therefore, the DoD must remain vigilant in order 
to maintain critical capabilities that are specialized for military applications 
and have very low demand compared with commercial products. 
 Aircraft Sector—The aircraft sector is comprised of commercial and defense 
aircraft. Defense aircraft are divided in three main sub-sectors: fixed-wing, 
rotary wing, and unmanned systems. The fixed-wing sub-sector includes 
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fighters, bombers, cargo, and transportation aircraft. The rotary wing sub-
sector includes helicopters used for combat, combat support, and services. 
Unmanned aircraft systems include the necessary components, network, and 
personnel to control an unmanned aircraft, including a launching element, if 
needed. There has been a steady decline in the number of defense 
development programs for fixed-wing and rotary wing aircraft. Modernization 
programs will help sustain important capabilities, but will not provide 
opportunities for major design, development, and integration work. Design 
shortfalls are also projected because much of the defense aerospace 
workforce is close to retirement, and the pool of young engineers available to 
replace them is migrating to other industries. 
 Shipbuilding Sector—The defense shipbuilding sector is comprised of 
seven shipyards and other shipyards which concentrate on commercial ships, 
but will periodically enter and exit the naval market. The U.S. shipbuilding 
industrial base depends on DoD business to sustain critical design and 
manufacturing skills, as well as to maintain their current infrastructure. 
 Combat Vehicles Sector—The ground vehicle sector is generally 
categorized in two broad vehicle classes: tactical wheeled vehicles (TWV) 
and combat vehicles. The TWV are usually commercial trucks modified for 
military use in demanding environments and/or missions. This type of truck 
benefits from dual-use or commercial demand. Combat vehicles, on the other 
hand, are typically heavily armored and integrated with complex weapons 
and systems; therefore, they have limited commercial application. This sector 
faces a number of industrial base challenges, including retaining critical 
design and integration skills, as well as sustaining critical suppliers in the sub-
sector tiers. 
Specific sub-sectors, tiers, and sub-tiers were identified in each of the sectors 
previously mentioned. Information about the specific risk is not discussed in this paper to 
protect business sensitive and pre-decisional information used in the analysis. However, an 
example of the aircraft sector, which has been openly discussed by DoD leadership, is 
provided in the next sections. 
Risk Level Assessment 
Risk level assessments for each of the sectors, sub-sectors, and tiers identified at 
high risk were conducted using the following timeframes: 
 FY11 (baseline) – BCA enactment  
 FY13 – Bipartisan Budget Act enactment 
 FY15 – Current FY at the time of the assessment 
 FY16 – Most current guidance for investment on the next five years at the 
time of the analysis 
The assessment was based on the number of DoD programs supporting the sectors 
at high risk over the time periods under evaluation and the acquisition phase of those 
programs.  
The final product was a risk level matrix for each of the industrial areas. Figure 4 
provides an example of the aircraft sector assessment. In this case, the assessment was 
done at the sub-sector level, fixed-wing-fighter aircraft. In 2011, there were multiple 
programs in manufacturing, and the F-35 program was supporting development activities. In 
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2013, there were still multiple programs in production, but the F-22 closed their production 
line and the F-35 development activities decreased. By 2015, most of the fighter programs 
were transitioning from a manufacturing phase to operations and sustainment. In addition, 
no new design work for fighters was expected, creating a development gap until the 2020s, 
when new fighter programs are expected to start. The FY16 PB included funds to start a 
program known as the Aerospace Innovation Initiative (AII). This program will help to sustain 
the development skills required to produce the next-generation of fighters, maintain 
competition in the sector, and promote innovation.  
Although the medium level indicates that mitigation plans are in place to address the 
risk, capabilities in the medium risk level will be highly dependent on budget decisions. 
Funding for mitigation plans may be transferred or delayed in order to fund higher priorities 
within the Department. Sub-sectors in this risk level should be monitored constantly. 
 
 Industrial Base Risk Level (Likelihood)—Aircraft Example 
Identifying the Effect of the BCA on the Defense Industrial Base 
Funding cuts due to the BCA will create additional barriers to overcome the current 
challenges. However, the impact of the BCA cannot be assessed in isolation. Decreasing 
procurement and R&D funds, Services’ priorities, the scheduled end of multiple DoD 
programs, and corporate strategic plans are other factors that will impact the industrial base 
and are considered when making decisions related to the BCA. 
The MIBP used the following sources to determine the impact of the BCA: 
 Presidential Budget—PB16 projects funding levels for FY16 to FY20. The 
trends in procurement and R&D budgets provide a good indication of the 
expected investments in the defense aircraft sector (see Figures 5 and 6). 
The fighter procurement and RDT&E funding stay relatively steady from 2018 
to 2020 due to the F-35 program. However, there is no new fighter 
development or procurement during that period of time. The decreasing trend 
in procurement and RDT&E investment may be worsened by the 
implementation of BCA cuts. 
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 DoD Investments in Fixed-Wing Procurement and RDT&E (PB16) 
 
 DoD Investments in Fighter Aircraft Procurement and RDT&E (PB16) 
 Subject matter experts (SMEs) from the Services and representatives of 
multiple DoD offices evaluated the potential impact of BCA enactment in 
FY16 to their current programs and plans. The following potential impacts 
were identified for the fixed-wing-fighter sub-sector: 
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o Aerospace Innovation Initiative (AII) funds may be eliminated. 
o RDT&E programs to advance sixth generation fighter technology may 
be reduced or eliminated. 
o BCA16-driven divestiture or reduction of aircraft fleets may affect 
primes and lower tier suppliers that are essential to capabilities 
sustainment. 
 SMEs applied the definitions in Table 2, industrial Base Consequences, to 
assess expected consequences if a capability is lost due to a BCA cut 
implementation. 
 
 Industrial Base Risks (Consequences) 
Updated Risk Assessment—The risk level was updated to reflect the potential impact 
of the BCA in FY16. It is important to note that the actual BCA impacts will depend on the 
Services’ budget and decision priorities at the time of the BCA cuts implementation. In the 
case of the fixed-wing-fighters sub-sector, the likelihood of losing critical capabilities 
increased. 
 
 Industrial Base Risk Assessment Including Potential BCA Impact 
The Final Outcome 
To finalize the analysis, a combination of all the factors assessed was provided for 
each sector and its respective sub-sectors and tiers (see Figure 9). DoD leadership will use 
this combination of factors to determine the industrial base risk levels and consequences in 
specific areas of the industrial base and make decisions about the potential cuts. For 
example, in Figure 8, the fighter aircraft risk level is expected to change from medium to 
high if BCA cuts are implemented. This could represent the elimination or delay of funds for 
a new program or implementation of a mitigation strategy. BCA implementation will require 
reducing or re-programming funds based on priorities. Leadership will use these data to 
establish priorities based on the risk level and consequences they are willing to accept. The 
risk level needs to be paired with the consequence when establishing priorities. 
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 Potential Impact of BCA on Industrial Base—Fixed-Wing Fighters 
Example 
Conclusion 
The results of the analysis provided the following conclusions: 
 BCA levels would have a significant negative impact on major sectors of the 
defense industrial base: The FY16 Presidential Budget included 
considerations and mitigation strategies necessary for a healthy industrial 
base capable of providing critical capabilities to the DoD. However, many of 
the DoD’s remediation efforts to protect high risk sectors and tiers may be at 
risk under the BCA. 
 The DoD’s future actions to reduce the potential impact of BCA16 on the 
industrial base will depend on the cuts across the Services to reduce costs 
while balancing force structure, readiness, and capability to meet current and 
future national security demands.  
 Policy changes and additional actions may be necessary to sustain the 
industrial base. 
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 The DoD can take the following steps to help sustain high-risk sectors and 
tiers under a BCA environment: 
o Develop acquisition strategies that promote competition while 
sustaining design and manufacturing skills. 
o Expand the use of available tools and program2 to mitigate industrial 
base risks. 
o Continue working on FaC assessment to identify critical capabilities at 
risk and develop mitigation strategies through groups like the Joint 
Industrial Base Working Group (JIBWG)3 and the Industrial Base 
Counsel (IBC).4 
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